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Abstract: Carbon footprinting of products and services is getting increasing attention due to the
growing emphasis on carbon related policies in many countries. As a result, many enterprises are
focusing on the design of green supply chains (GSCs) with research on supply chains (SCs) focused not
only on cost efficiency, but also on its environmental consequences. The review presented in this paper
focuses on the implications of carbon policies on SCs. The concept of content analysis is used to retrieve
and analyze the information regarding drivers (carbon policies), actors (for example, manufacturers
and retailers), methodologies (mathematical modeling techniques), decision-making contexts (such as,
facility location and order quantity), and emission reduction opportunities. The review shows a
lack of emissions analysis of SCs that face carbon policies in different countries. The research also
focuses on the design of carbon policies for emissions reduction in different operating situations.
Some possible research directions are also discussed at the end of this review.
Keywords: supply chain management; carbon policy; carbon emission; sustainability; green supply chains
1. Introduction
Carbon emission is considered one of the main contributors to global warming. As industries are
assumed to be one of the major contributors to these emissions, their processes, and supply chains (SC)
are increasingly subjected to various carbon policies [1].
Five major carbon policies generally considered by governments are the carbon cap, carbon tax,
carbon cap-and-trade, carbon subsidy, and carbon offset policies. The carbon cap policy provides a
specific limit on carbon emissions for industries [2]. The carbon tax policy requires industries to pay a
unit fee for their emissions [3,4]. The cap-and-trade policy, also called carbon trading policy, allows
the industry to sell or purchase emissions in a trading market [5,6]. A carbon subsidy policy allows
industries to get a rebate for a unit reduction in carbon emission [7,8], and finally, a carbon offset policy
allows industries to provide investments to projects that offsets their higher carbon emissions [3,9].
Although these are the basic carbon policies, some of countries have experimented with hybrid
policies, such as the combination of carbon tax and carbon offset, as reported by Wang-Helmreich and
Kreibich [10]. Due to the increasing adoption of carbon policies by governments, industries are also
focusing on carbon issues in their SCs [11–13].
Carbon emissions are also associated with product life cycles and are referred to as the carbon
footprint [11,14], essentially prompting a reduction of carbon emissions at different stages of the
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product life cycle [15–17]. Since emissions reduction tends to increase the cost of a supply system [18],
both government and industry should also evaluate the economic impact of such a reduction. Zhou
and Wen [19] mention that a firm’s behaviour changes when carbon constraints are imposed on its
business processes. This type of change can help the decision makers to understand the implications
carbon policies in businesses. Schaltegger and Csutora [20] mention the accounting of emissions
in order to promote sustainability. Kolk, et al. [21] mention the importance of establishing a clear
mechanism to disclose emissions. Herold and Lee [22] mention that both internal and external
carbon management practices of a firm influence the carbon disclosure strategies. However, correct
assessments and evaluation can provide an opportunity to develop sustainable and green supply
chains (GSCs). Daryanto, et al. [23] have also emphasized the development of a global GSC.
Various quantitative models are developed to assess costs and emissions in a SC. Govindan, et al. [24]
review multi-criteria approaches for green SC analysis and selection. The analysis of SCs concerning the
voluntary emission reduction is well developed [20,25–27], however, research on holistic perspectives
of carbon policies in the GSCs are not adequate. Three research questions emerge for review: (1) What
modelling techniques are adopted to assess the impacts of various carbon policies on SCs? (2) What are
the differential impacts of the widely employed carbon polices on SCs, in terms of cost and emissions
reductions? (3) What are future research directions for evaluating the effectiveness and the efficiency
of the carbon polices with a SC perspective? This review addresses these questions by highlighting the
development and trends in GSCs under different carbon policies. The review uses the content analysis
method as discussed in Section 2. This method is used to scrutinize the research in terms of the drivers,
actors, methods, decisions and the opportunities that help in the design and implementation of GSCs.
The result of the review is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, conclusions and possible research directions
are discussed.
2. Review Methodology
The content analysis method prompts for a systematic search of the factors in the given research
context [28]. Authors mention that the content analysis method assists in evaluating the symbolic
content of the literature available in various databases Pokharel and Mutha [29], Caunhye, et al. [30].
Content analysis is used here to search for information primarily from electronic databases such as
ScienceDirect, EmeraldInsight, Taylor and Francis, and Inderscience. Keyword-based and phrase-based
searches are also advised by Kondracki et al. [31] to collect the information. For this review, keywords
including carbon emission, closed-loop supply chain, carbon policy, carbon tax, cap-and-trade, carbon
offset, carbon cap, green supply chain, and sustainable supply chain are used. Literature was streamed
to quantitative models under carbon policies. The selected literature is then segregated to a set of five
content categories, as shown in Figure 1.
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As shown in Figure 1, carbon regulations (policies) are considered as the drivers for the design
or redesign of SCs. The implementation of these policies involves various actors within a SC. In a
SC, the actors can include a combination of two or more of the supplier, manufacturer, third party
logistics provider (3PL), retailer, and the recycler. A two-echelon SC contains two actors, generally the
manufacturer and the supplier, or the manufacturer and the retailer. In this case, the materials and the
products flow in the forward direction. A multi-echelon SC contains three or more actors, for example,
supplier, manufacturer, 3PL, and retailer. Similar to a two echelon SC, products and flows are also
considered in a multi-echelon SC. A multi-echelon SC can contain both forward and the reverse flows
of materials and products, called a closed loop supply chain (CLSC).
The analysis of SCs can be done in terms of problem simplification, established modeling
techniques, or algorithms. The model outcomes can be in terms of one or more of the following:
transportation mode selection, facility location, inventory level, order quantity, technology, and
production quantity.
From all the collected literature, 85 were found to be closely related to this study. The literature is
grouped for different levels and policies as shown in Figure 2. The columns in Figure 2 represent the
number of papers under each group, for example, a discussion on taxation for different SCs (the first
column). It is noted that the column labelled others refers to policies such as subsidies and carbon
offsets. The number of papers is double-counted if a study discusses two or more policies. The depth of
the color in the columns shows the research intensity at a particular level. The review shows that most
of the literature focuses on multi-echelon SCs. Similarly, cap and trade and carbon tax are the most
researched carbon policies. Additional literature is used for highlighting the importance of policies
and emissions.
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3. Results of the Literature Review
In this section, selected articles are grouped in different subsections in order to answer the research
questions stated in Section 1. The review focuses on different aspects of GSC as shown in Figure 1.
The insight developed for each of these related aspects is given below.
3.1. Drivers and Actors
The review shows that cap-and-trade and carbon tax policies are the most important drivers
followed by carbon cap schemes. For example, the carbon tax policy is adopted in Japan, Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and the cap-and-trade policy is adopted in Europe and China. Economists
and policymakers favor the carbon tax as it requires lesser administration in its implementation [13,32].
The cap-and-trade policy offers the opportunity for firms to share the benefits of low-emission activities
by carbon trading [33]. The review shows that most of the research focuses on the activities associated
with the forward flows in a supply system, only a few studies have explored the decisions for CLSCs.
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3.2. Models and Decisions
3.2.1. Two-Echelon Level
Research on two-echelon not only focuses on the manufacturing processes, but also on the
emissions generated during inventory [34–38] and transportation [36,37,39]. Table 1 illustrates the SC
models according to their carbon policies, modeling techniques, SC actors, and decisions. Most of
the models consider cap-and-trade policy, followed by a carbon tax policy. Some of these models are
discussed below.
Stackelberg Game (SG) models are also used by the researchers to optimize the two-echelon
SCs for carbon price [40–42], and product price Xia and Zhi [11], Hafezalkotob [43], Ren, et al. [44],
Qi, et al. [45]. In these models, the government is mostly considered as the leader and the organization
with the SCs is considered as the follower. Between the manufacturer and retailer, the former is usually
considered as the leader for SC. Xu, et al. [46] provide a SC coordination model under cap-and-trade
regulations in a make-to-order SC with wholesale prices and cost-sharing contracts. Hafezalkotob [43]
introduces a tariff policy in the coordination model and shows different impacts on centralized and
decentralized SCs. In an uncoordinated SC, the environmental impact would be different. For both the
centralized and decentralized SCs, raising tariff rates can lead to an increase in demand for greener
products, thus reducing the emissions Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [47]. Wang, et al. [48] examine the
carbon tax policy for a decentralized SC by using a three-stage SG model and centralized SC by using
a two-stage SG model. The authors show that both the cost and emission of a SC can be reduced if
the actors have a distributed pricing power. Yang, et al. [49] considered two competitive SCs under
the cap-and-trade scheme. In the vertical direction, the manufacturer and retailer are the leader and
follower of a SG, respectively. In the horizontal direction, there is a Nash game about the emission
reduction decisions between manufacturers. Their analysis shows that vertical cooperation leads
to higher emissions reduction and lower retail prices. Yi and Li [42] establish a SG model with a
manufacturer and a retailer with incentives (subsidies) and carbon tax. It was revealed that a subsidy
policy can always drive energy saving and emissions reductions, while the effectiveness of the carbon
tax policy relies on the initial emissions level and the exact carbon tax. The first observation in Yi and
Li [42] is also highlighted by Yuan, Gu, Guo, Xia and Xu [38]. The problem with multiple competing
retailers in the SG game is discussed by Li [50], Qi, Wang and Bai [45], and Zhou, et al. [51,52]. Zhou,
Hu and Zhou [51] treat the carbon policy parameter as the decision variable and recommend that the
government should tighten the carbon tax if the market has intensive retail competition.
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Table 1. Models and decisions at the two-echelon level.
Author Carbon Regulations Modeling Techniques Actors Decisions
Hua, Cheng and Wang [35] Cap-and-trade E-EOQ Single manufacturer-retailer Order quantity
Barari, Agarwal, Zhang,
Mahanty and Tiwari [9] Tax Evolutionary game theory Single supplier-manufacturer Emission cost and marketing cost
Choi [53] Tax Integral equation Single manufacturer-retailer Order quantity
Du, Zhu, Liang and Ma [40] Cap-and-trade SG Single emission permit supplier and singleemission-dependent manufacturer Production quantity and carbon price
Jaber, et al. [54] Tax, cap-and-trade NLP Single manufacturer-retailer Production rate and joint lot size
Xia and Zhi [11] Cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer-retailer Retailer’s promotion level, emission reduction of per unit product
Yang, et al. [55] Tax, cap, cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer-retailer Order quantity
Hafezalkotob [43] Joint tax and subsidy SG Single manufacturer-retailer Retail price, tariff for products
He, Zhao and Xia [15] Tax SG Single supplier-manufacturer Emission decrements
Hovelaque and Bironneau [34] Tax E-EOQ Single supplier-manufacturer Order quantity
Bazan, Jaber and Zanoni [36] Tax, cap Classical coordinationmodel and VMI-CS Single manufacturer-retailer Production rate, number and size of shipments(truck)
Li [50] Tax NLP Single distributor, multiple retailers Delivery cycle, vehicle type
Ren, Bian, Xu and He [44] Cap SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, retail price, quota allocation
Jiang, et al. [56] Cap-and-trade E-EOQ Single supplier-manufacturer Order quantity
Qi, Wang and Bai [45] Cap SG Single manufacturer, two retailers Retail and wholesale prices
Li, Su and Ma [39] Joint tax and cap-and-trade E-EOQ Single manufacturer-retailer Production rate, order quantity and number of shipments(truck)
Qiu, Qiao and Pardalos [37] Cap-and-trade MIP Single manufacturer, multiple retailers Production quantity, inventory, vehicle route, customer satisfaction
Xu, He, Xu and Zhang [46] Cap-and-trade SG Single supplier-manufacturer Wholesale price, order quantities
Xu, et al. [57] Cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale prices, production quantities
Ghosh, et al. [58] Cap E-EOQ Single manufacturer-retailer Order quantity, reorder point, number of shipments
Ji, et al. [59] Cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, marginal profit, promotion degree, emissionreduction rate
Hafezalkotob [60] tariff SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, retail price, tariff
Yang, Zhang and Ji [49] Cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, retail price
Yi and Li [42] Joint tax and subsidy SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, retail price, energy-saving level, carbon-emissionlevel
Zhou, Hu and Zhou [51] Tax Dynamic game model Single manufacturer, multiple retailers Retail price, wholesale price, carbon tax
Yuan, Gu, Guo, Xia and Xu [38] Cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, order quantities
Yuyin and Jinxi [8] Joint tax and subsidy SG Single manufacturer-retailer Wholesale price, retail price, energy-saving level
Bai, Gong, Jin and Xu [52] Cap-and-trade SG Single manufacturer, multiple retailers Wholesale price, retail price, green technology level
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In a SC with two single actors, the enhanced economic order quantity (E-EOQ) model is used to
obtain the optimal order quantity for the manufacturers [34,35,56] under a carbon policy. The E-EOQ
model is adapted to determine the order quantity under the carbon tax [26] and the cap-and-trade
policy [35]. Bazan, Jaber and Zanoni [36] analyzed the total SC costs through two different models.
The authors concluded that the vendor managed inventory (VMI) with consignment stock agreement
policy yields fewer SC costs compared to a classically coordinated SC. Jaber, Glock and El Saadany [54]
discuss an integrated carbon tax and cap-and-trade policy by considering a penalty cost for exceeding
the allowed emissions limit. The authors used a non-linear programming (NLP) model for the analysis
and showed that penalties can be more effective in promoting GSCs than the coordinated policy for
individual actors (the manufacturer and the retailer). Li, Su and Ma [39] adopt the E-EOQ model to
examine production jointly with transportation outsourcing, and show that such a model can provide
emissions reduction that is higher than that obtained through the cap-and-trade policy. The authors
also mention that with the increase in the carbon price, emissions reduction also becomes smoother.
Chen and Chen [32] developed an input-output model with standard emissions per unit of the product.
The authors mention that the adoption of emissions standards can lead to a reduction in emissions and
costs over the long term.
The emissions from transportation depends on the truck type [39,50] and the vehicle route [32],
freight volume, and the delivery strategy. A probability model is used by Li [50] to model the delivery
strategy for the distributors. The energy consumption as a function of freight volume for E-EOQ
is considered by Li, Su and Ma [39]. Chen and Chen [32] combined the orders and transportation
of the goods by using differential equations and NLP. The authors concluded that a joint policy of
cap-and-trade and carbon tax can result in to a higher emissions reduction when the carbon prices
are small.
All of the models surveyed here, except for the models in [38,40,58], consider a single period and a
deterministic demand. When the market is emissions sensitive, any reduction in emissions would lead
to a higher production cost and the demand quantities for the products follow an inverse function [41].
Du, Zhu, Liang and Ma [40] propose a coordination model under the cap-and-trade policy with the
supplier having an emissions permit, and a manufacturer that is emission-dependent. Ghosh, Jha
and Sarmah [58] analyze the policy of a strict carbon cap to develop a mathematical model for a two
echelon SC that faces stochastic demand and partial back orders. The carbon constraint is used in the
model to optimize costs and order quantity. The reorder point, as well as the number of optimum
shipments, is also obtained from the model. Yuan, Gu, Guo, Xia and Xu [38] consider a cap-and-trade
policy with known probability density function of the demand and information asymmetry in a SC.
Jaber, Glock and El Saadany [54] investigated the cap-and-trade scheme in an environment with
environment-concerned consumers, while Li [50] derived the optimal delivery strategies considering
the time-dependent demands under the carbon tax policy.
3.2.2. Multi-Echelon Level
Some authors [61–63] discuss that the cost-based SC design and emissions based SC designs are
different. Therefore, the relationship between carbon policies and multi-echelon SC decisions should
be studied carefully. Table 2 provides constraints, modeling techniques, algorithms and tools, and the
decisions associated with models for multi-echelon SC design and planning.
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Table 2. Models and decisions at the multi-echelon level.
Author Carbon Regulations Constraints Modeling Techniques Decisions
Nagurney, et al. [64] Tax / Variational inequality theory Carbon tax rate
Ramudhin, Chaabane and Paquet [26] Cap-and-trade Handling capacity, BOM MILP Logistics, facility location, supplier selection,transportation mode
Giarola, et al. [65] Cap-and-trade Handling capacity MILP Selecting the best biomass and technologiesoptions
Abdallah, et al. [66] Cap-and-trade Handling capacity, Materialsupply MILP Logistics, facility location, supplier selection
Ortiz-Gutiérrez, et al. [67] Cap-and-trade Handling capacity MILP Logistics, manufacturing technology, facilitylocation
Jin, et al. [68] Tax, cap, cap-and-trade / MILP Logistics, transportation mode
He, et al. [69] Tax and cap / Input-output Inventory level, production quantity
Luo and Tang [70] Cap-and-trade Changeover variable MILP model Inventory level, production quantity
Palak, Eks¸iog˘lu and Geunes [3] Tax, cap, cap-and-trade, offset MILP, E-EOQ Logistics, supplier selection, transport modes
Tseng and Hung [71] Tax Handling capacity MILP Logistics, transport modes
Osmani and Zhang [72] Tax Handling capacity Stochastic MILP Logistics, technology, inventory level, facilitycapacity
Fahimnia, et al. [73] Tax, cap-and-trade Handling capacity MINLP model Logistics, inventory level
Hammami, et al. [74] Cap, tax Handling capacity, lead time Production-inventory Logistics, facility location
Ni and Shu [75] Cap, tax Storage capacity, service level MINLP Bounds of service time
Martí, et al. [76] Tax, cap / E-EOQ Facility location, customer allocation, transportmodes
Fahimnia, et al. [77] Tax Handling capacity MINLP Logistics, vehicle speed
Wu, et al. [78] Tax Handling capacity, transmissionconstraints SG Carbon tax rate
Zakeri, Dehghanian, Fahimnia and Sarkis [5] Offset Material supply, capacity MILP Logistics, inventory level, facility location
Shaw, et al. [79] Cap-and-trade Handling capacity chance constrainedprogramming theory Logistics, facility location
Moon, Jeong and Saha [62] Cap-and-trade Material supply, capacity MILP Logistics, facility location, inventory level
Sarkar, et al. [80] multi-level trade credit / NLP Logistics
Zhou, et al. [81] Tariff Handling capacity Stochastic MINLP Logistics, facility location, transport modes
Ma, Ho, Ji and Talluri [13] Tax Inventory capacity SG Sales price and production rate
Saxena, Jain and Sharma [4] Tax Handling capacity Fuzzy goal programming Logistics, facility location
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The review presented in Table 2 shows that in multi-echelon SCs, logistics and facility location
are the most important business decisions, followed by the selection of suppliers and transportation
modes. Other researchers incorporate the technology options [65,67,72] and inventory level
controls [13,62,70,73]. Beside the capacity limit, the material supply constraint [5,62,66], the customer
service level constraint [6], the bill of material constraint [26], and the changeover constraint in sintering
for the steel industry [70] are also considered for a multi-level SC design.
Table 2 also shows that mixed integer linear programming (MILP) is the most used approach in
GSC design. Abdallah, Farhat, Diabat and Kennedy [66] consider green procurement and propose a
MILP model to minimize the emissions in a SC. Their case study indicates that if the cap-and-trade policy
were adopted in heavy manufacturing industries, the adoption of green technology and transportation
would become more important. Fahimnia, Sarkis, Boland, Reisi and Goh [77] link the carbon tax with
the fuel price in determining flows and truck speed in GSC design. They highlight that a reduction in
fuel cost can be balanced by an increase in carbon price per ton.
Palak, Eks¸iog˘lu and Geunes [3] analyze the impact of carbon policies on the selection of the
supplier and transportation mode for a biofuel SC. Osmani and Zhang [72] develop a stochastic
model with MILP formulation by considering a SC design for biofuel. The dynamic evolution of a
bioethanol SC is studied through a multi-period and multi-objective MILP by Ortiz-Gutiérrez, Giarola
and Bezzo [67]. The authors used the ε-constraint method for their analysis. Multiple objective MILP
optimization models are proposed by Moon, Jeong and Saha [62] to minimize the shortages of raw
materials and maximize the profit in a SC over the chosen multiple periods, and Ramudhin, Chaabane
and Paquet [26] for analyzing the emissions and logistics costs for a SC.
Research is usually focused on the linear relationship between variables and the goals of the model,
specifically for operational decisions like inventory level given in [75] and transportation mode given
in [81]. Li, et al. [82] mention another impact, a change in product configuration due to carbon policies.
Ni and Shu [75] use mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) model to analyze carbon
emissions and service time trade-off under the carbon cap and carbon tax policies. Their study reveals
that under carbon policies, the cost of the SC becomes lower when there is a larger safety stock holding
capacity. For transportation related research, the impact of carbon tariffs on the SC design is considered.
However, authors like Hafezalkotob [43], Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [47], Hafezalkotob [60], and Zhou,
Gong, Huang and Peters [81] mention that carbon tariffs can be administered as a tax by a country to
the production system based in another country. Such a tax may help in the coordination of carbon
pricing across the supply chain [83].
Some authors have used game theory to develop optimal strategies for individual actors in a
decentralized GSC. The authors mention that taxes can have a detrimental effect on the profit levels
and therefore, incentives are useful to implement methods and technologies to reduce emissions.
Wu et al. [68] investigate carbon taxes in a decentralized SC in order to maximize multiple actors’
profits. Similarly, Nagurney, Liu and Woolley [64] propose a model based on variational inequality
theory in the context of the electric power supply chain under the carbon tax. Using a two-stage game
model, Ma, Ho, Ji and Talluri [13] analyze a coordinated pricing problem subjected to the carbon
tax. The authors develop pricing game models through two equilibrium models, the open loop and
Markovian Nash. Sarkar, Ahmed and Kim [80] introduce a multi-level trade credit policy that serves
as financial assistance for SC actors. The authors proved that this carbon policy is able to improve
the economic and environmental performance of a three-echelon supply chain. Daryanto, Wee and
Astanti [23] consider the emissions costs and its impact on single and multiple echelons. The authors
mention that in order to avoid asymmetric power of a player, a game theory type of model may be
more suitable in SC analysis.
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One of the important aspects of GSCs is the uncertainty in demand over the long term. Demand
uncertainty has been considered by He, Xu and Niu [69], Osmani and Zhang [72] through a probability
density function based on an input-output model for carbon policy and the loss of profit for the
firms. Shaw, Irfan, Shankar and Yadav [79] incorporate the uncertainties in capacities of the supplier,
manufacturer and warehouse, and demand in order to develop a chance-constrained model of a GSC
network. Their analysis shows a direct correlation between the number of manufacturing plants and
the carbon price. It also shows that a higher demand variation results in higher carbon emissions.
Osmani and Zhang [72] developed a stochastic MILP model considering multi-period and two-stage
for a dual-feedstock lignocellulosic-based bioethanol supply chain design.
Santibanez-Gonzalez [84] use the multi-period two-stage model to analyze the GSC for carbon
dioxide capture and storage in geological reservoirs. The authors consider uncertainty in the reservoir
capacity in order to develop a MILP stochastic model for the analysis of cost and capacity in the SC.
Saxena, Jain and Sharma [4] investigate the impact of supply and demand uncertainty and carbon
tax policies. The authors obtain results for the number and location of new plants or extension of
capacities for the planning period considered for remanufacturing.
3.2.3. Closed-Loop Level
The modeling techniques, constraints, decisions, and the algorithms of the models developed for
CLSCs are given in Table 3. Unlike the study at other SC levels, the cap-and-trade is discussed more
explicitly in CLSCs. Once the return and recycling of products are incorporated, the impact of carbon
policies on CLSC and the relationship between the firms get more complex. Shu, et al. [85] analyze
carbon tax and carbon subsidies to develop a two-stage SG model by considering the manufacturers,
retailers, and the consumers as the entities of the SC. The authors show that subsidies should be used
on carbon tax in order to obtain profit and to reduce emissions.
Some researchers use operational variables in their models, such as the batch size in manufacturing
and shipment [86], inventory levels [87–89], technologies [87], product prices [7,88,89], and
transportation modes [16,33,90]. The cost and emissions generated from both manufacturing and
remanufacturing activities are also studied based on the variational inequality formula theory [88,89]
and the game theory [7]. Li, Du, Yang and Hua [7] mention that, for the reduction in emissions,
the subsidy should depend on the recycling price range. Bazan, Jaber and Zanoni [86] compare the
classical model and the vendor-managed inventory with consignment stock agreement (VMI-CS)
model for a CLSC with a manufacturer and a retailer with a facility for remanufacturing. They observed
that the VMI-CS model outperforms the classical model in terms of cost reduction for a wide range of
manufacturing rates, but not necessarily a more environmentally responsible choice.
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Table 3. Models and decisions on the closed-loop level.
Author Carbon Regulations Constraints Modeling Techniques Algorithms and Tool Decisions
Chaabane, Ramudhin and
Paquet [87] Cap-and-trade
Capacity, number of
facilities MILP LINGO/LINDO
Logistics, inventory level, facility location,
technology
Fahimnia, Sarkis, Dehghanian,
Banihashemi and Rahman [2] Tax Capacity MILP AMPL/CPLEX Logistics, facility location
Gao and Ryan [90] Tax, cap-and-trade Capacity Stochastic MILP Gams/CPLEX Logistics, facility location, transportationmode
Li, Du, Yang and Hua [7] Carbon subsidy / Game theory / Price of raw materials, wholesale and retailprice of unit product
Zhang, Sun, Hu and Dai [88] Cap, tax / Variational inequalityformula theory
Modified project
contraction algorithm Logistics, inventory level, product price
Choudhary, Sarkar, Settur and
Tiwari [12] Tax, cap, cap-and-trade Capacity MILP
Forest data structure
algorithm Logistics, facility location
Bing, et al. [91] Cap-and-trade Capacity enhancement MILP LamaSoft/Xpress Logistics, emission quota, facility location
Tao, Guang, Hao and Song [89] Cap, tax
Periodic and global
carbon emission
constraint
Variational inequality and
complement theory
Modified projection and
contraction algorithm Logistics, inventory level, product price
Mohammed, et al. [92] Tax, cap, cap-and-trade,offset Capacity Stochastic MILP Gams/CPLEX
Logistics, facility location, transportation
mode
Entezaminia, Heidari and
Rahmani [33]
Tax, cap, cap-and-trade,
offset Capacity, technology MILP CPLEX
Logistics, facility location, transportation
mode, inventory level
Xu, et al. [93] Tax, cap, cap-and-trade Capacity, number offacilities MILP CPLEX Logistics, facility location
Bazan, Jaber and Zanoni [86] Tax and cap Capacity NLP / Batch size for shipment and manufacturing
Xu, Elomri, Pokharel, Zhang,
Ming and Liu [17] cap
Capacity, number of
facilities Robust MILP CPLEX Logistics, facility location
Haddadsisakht and Ryan [16] Tax Capacity Hybrid robust/stochasticmodel CPLEX Logistics, facility location
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A CLSC network coordination is also widely researched area. Most of the papers on CLSCs
under carbon regulations have focused on a centralized system. Xu, Pokharel, Elomri and Mutlu [93]
compare the effects of the carbon cap, carbon tax, and carbon cap-and-trade on hybrid and dedicated
facilities for CLSCs. Their results show that under a cap-and-trade policy, dedicated CLSCs can have
better emissions reductions. Similarly, cost efficiency is achieved for dedicated CLSCs under carbon
cap policies, and emissions reduction is achieved in a hybrid CLSC under carbon tax policy.
The research on the decentralized CLSCs is also considered in the literature for optimizing the
product price. Zhang, Sun, Hu and Dai [88] use variational inequality formula theory and studied the
CLSC network equilibrium problem with the carbon tax policy and the carbon cap policy in order to
optimize the prices of raw materials and the product. Tao, Guang, Hao and Song [89] consider the
periodic emission and global emission constraints in a CLSC network equilibrium. The authors use
variational inequality and complement theory for the equilibrium model and show that when carbon
constraints are imposed, the profit levels for SC entities in a CLSC decrease.
Some authors have studied uncertainty in demand and product return in a CLSC. Mohammed,
Selim, Hassan and Syed [92] use multiple scenarios to propose a stochastic model in order to design
and plan a multiple product CLSC for multiple periods facing uncertain demand and returns. Bing,
Bloemhof-Ruwaard, Chaabane and van der Vorst [91] consider carbon trading for a global plastic waste
reverse SC redesign. The investigation shows that in order to reduce costs and emissions, the relocation
of re-processors of the used products may be necessary. Uncertainties in demand and product returns
are discussed by Gao and Ryan [90] by considering the emissions released during transportation.
Haddadsisakht and Ryan [16] use a hybrid robust/stochastic model under volatile carbon tax rate and
show that carbon tax does not directly influence the number of facilities. The number depends more
on the use of the transportation modes.
Xu, Elomri, Pokharel, Zhang, Ming and Liu [17] investigate uncertainties related to global solid
waste recycling. The uncertainties could be due to foreign exchange, the quantity of waste collected,
and/or the cost of transportation. Their analysis shows that if there is a carbon cap, it is better to recycle
the waste in the generating countries rather than in the waste importing countries.
For a CLSC, almost all of the selected literature focuses on the reduction of the effect of carbon
regulations by using optimization on logistics in the SC. With regards to facility locations in the CLSC
network design, the most popular techniques are the Stochastic MILP [90,92] and robust MILP [17].
3.3. Effect of the Carbon Policies
3.3.1. Carbon Tax Policy
A stream of research is focused on emission reduction under the carbon tax policy. This tax policy
provides more flexibility, but compared to the other three carbon policies, it can impose a bigger
financial burden to reach certain emission targets [33,85]. Some authors have mentioned that reduction
in emissions is possible without a substantial increase in the cost [18,94]. However, both the cost and the
emissions would decrease if a co-option strategy is used by the firms under the cap-and-trade policy [95].
A co-option strategy refers to the coexistence of collaboration and competition mechanisms in a system.
Cachon [96] investigates the emission reduction opportunities for the retailer by considering the
emissions generated by the consumers. The research shows that carbon emissions are reduced more
with an increase in fuel efficiency than with carbon tax. However, in a two-echelon SC, if subsidy and
carbon tax policies are promoted simultaneously, both the manufacturer and the retailer would be
encouraged to focus on the efficiency [42]. The same conclusion is also obtained by Shu, Huang, Chen,
Wang and Lai [85] in trade-old-for-remanufactured CLSC. Olsen, et al. [97] mention that if a carbon tax
is implemented through proper analysis of their impact, it can support government investments in
projects that reduce emissions. With good pricing, companies may also be attracted to invest in carbon
sequestration. Carbon tax is an important policy as it not only assists to generate funds and reduce
emissions, it can also assist in developing a comprehensive policy on climate reform [98].
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Li [50] mentions that if carbon taxes are not high, distributors adopt frequent delivery strategies,
potentially leading to a higher delivery cost. However, if retailers and manufacturers use a wholesale
pricing contract or the markdown money contract under a carbon tax policy, it can successfully entice
the retailer to source locally [53,99]. Choi [100] mentions that carbon footprint-based taxation may also
bring changes in sourcing decisions. The buyer may consider saving through local sourcing, even if
production and logistics costs are higher.
Under the carbon tax policy, optimal CLSC designs may involve improvement or deterioration in
terms of costs and emissions [2]. Therefore, carbon subsidies can help to reduce emissions, especially
when the carbon tax is very high [2]. However, Li, Du, Yang and Hua [7] mention that the recycling
price range should be considered while developing a subsidy policy. In a CLSC involving uncertain
demand and returns, Gao and Ryan [90] show that if there is a variation in the flow of the product,
then both the costs and the emissions for a CLSC would increase. Xu, Elomri, Pokharel, Zhang, Ming
and Liu [17] obtained similar results for a global reverse logistics network design with a global carbon
cap policy.
Although a reasonable tax rate is required, only a few studies such as Zhou, Hu and Zhou [51],
Nagurney, Liu and Woolley [64], Wu, Huang, Hsu, Wang, Lin and Chen [78] treat it as a variable in the
models. The most popular approach in the literature is to use sensitivity analysis in evaluating the
carbon tax rate in order to promote GSCs.
3.3.2. Carbon Cap Policy
The carbon cap policy can be applied with two principles, that is, grandfathering and benchmarking.
Ji, Zhang and Yang [59] mention that the grandfathering principle uses the trend of emissions, but
benchmarking focuses on the output based on a common benchmark in the sector. Their analysis
shows that the adoption of benchmarked processes can lead to the production of low carbon products.
However, the carbon cap policy does not always yield a low cost solution [101] as the carbon cap level
is the most important factor for the industries [33]. Therefore, the knowledge on a range of carbon cap
becomes important for policymakers to design different levels of carbon cap [45]. Between carbon tax
and carbon cap policies, the latter is generally less flexible in terms of emission reduction cost [33] but
it usually leads to a lower total cost [69,76].
Some studies have extended the application of the common carbon cap policy to analyze the
GSCs. For example, Xu, Elomri, Pokharel, Zhang, Ming and Liu [17] introduce a global carbon cap
policy for GSCs by considering the flow of electrical wastes and find when policy changes in different
countries the flow of wastes also changes. Some authors (such as [74,88,89]) have considered periodic
carbon emission constraints and a global carbon emission constraint on the CLSC. Hammami, Nouira
and Frein [74] mention that periodic carbon caps lead to lower emissions, but the per unit emissions
may be increased compared to that of the global cap. Zhang, Sun, Hu and Dai [88], however, find that
a global carbon cap is better than the periodic carbon cap. Tao et al. [76] mention that the global cap
has an advantage when the emission limit is high, while the periodic cap is superior when the emission
limit is low. He, Xu and Niu [69] introduce the carbon emission elasticity of profit measure to evaluate
the impact of carbon policies and show that the mandatory cap is better than the carbon tax from an
industry standpoint. Martí, Tancrez and Seifert [76] mention that the optimal network structure for the
carbon tax and carbon cap policies are similar. However, if the service time constraint is considered,
the carbon tax policy may have more effect in the SC design [75].
3.3.3. Cap-and-Trade Policy
The cap-and-trade policy has been researched more explicitly than other carbon policies as there
are opportunities for income or offsets [5]. With cap-and-trade policy implementation, emissions and
costs could decrease simultaneously [15,35,93]). Comparatively, under cap-and-trade policy, firms
would not be motivated to adopt green remanufacturing technologies when the customer has an
independent demand for remanufactured products [102]. This case is reversed when there is a market
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for such products [103]. If more customers opt for low-carbon products, the cap-and-trade would be
an asset to the manufacturing company [104].
Zakeri, Dehghanian, Fahimnia and Sarkis [5] mention that, in energy intensive industries like
aluminum, the carbon-trading policy can result in better emissions reduction than the carbon tax policy.
However, for manufacturers aiming to adopt green technology, the profit level decreases with the
carbon cap policy than with the cap-and-trade policy [105]. Palak, Eks¸iog˘lu and Geunes [3] mention
that a cap-and-trade policy is better than a carbon offset policy. However, for the carbon offset policy,
the trading market effect of carbon cap and carbon price pose differential effects on the SC.
Supply chain operations are less responsive to an increase in price versus an increase in the carbon
cap [3]. The potential for the reduction in emissions with the carbon cap alone is limited [91,106].
The variation in the carbon cap does not impact the strategies for optimal trade credit or inventory
replenishment [106]. It is not always possible to obtain emission or cost reduction through a lower
cap level [91]. However, with the carbon cap and the use of heterogeneous transportation modes,
both costs and emissions may be reduced [102]. Yenipazarli [102] uses the SG model and finds that a
carbon cap either reduces or maintains the emissions level. There is an appropriate threshold of the
carbon cap for emission reduction [45], therefore, in an emission-trading environment, a two-threshold
policy is used for decision making [57] If the carbon cap is lower than one threshold, emission permits
are bought by the manufacturer from the market, however, if the cap is between the two thresholds,
the manufacturer becomes indifferent in the purchase or sale of emission permits. A similar finding is
also obtained by Yenipazarli [102], Li, et al. [107], and Hafezalkotob [43]. Hence, the carbon cap should
be carefully set in order for it to be effective in emissions reduction.
The carbon tax policy may be a more effective option for reducing emissions compared to a carbon
cap [6]. Carbon price influences the operational costs and the level of emissions. Therefore, GSC
designs should consider logistics as well. This view is proposed by various authors for two-echelon
SCs [37], the multi-echelon SCs [39,55], Fahimnia, Sarkis, Boland, Reisi and Goh [77] and the closed-loop
SCs [33,93]. Other authors [68,70,87,91,108] have also mentioned the need to use global perspectives
on the SC design.
In general, the cap-and-trade policy shows advantages in motivating the industry to pursue GSCs.
However, its impact on the supply and consumption of carbon credits in GSCs should be explored
further. This review found only two studies [40,41] that focus on SCs with large emissions, such as
those from the power plants and paper factories. However, such SCs release emissions for a long time.
Therefore, the cap and the volatility in the carbon trading market may affect the level of emissions
reduction in such SCs. The review also shows that the research on the SCs at multi-echelon and
closed-loop levels across the global network is still absent.
4. Conclusions
This paper focuses on the review of the research on the GSC design. The review shows that
research on GSCs has increased since 2012 due to growing worldwide environmental concerns and the
tightening enforcement of carbon policies in many countries.
Various quantitative models can be considered for the GSC design. However, the choice of
a quantitative model depends mainly on the actors involved, followed by the strategic and the
operational SC decisions to be made, rather than solely on the carbon policies. Most of the research on
multi-echelon and the CLSC are focused on facility location, flows, the choice of suppliers, and the
transportation mode. Some researchers also consider demand uncertainty, multiple period transactions
for profit maximization.
The review shows that MILP techniques are the most popular techniques for CLSCs. Although
advances in optimization algorithms are making it easier to solve large models; such models have a
limited capability for integrating the strategic and multi-period operations.
From the perspective of carbon policy, most studies focus on cap-and-trade, followed by the
carbon tax and the mandatory cap. The carbon policy with a mandatory cap is more effective than
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that without it, but they are not always efficient. The carbon tax policy may be better, but the cost of
implementing it might be a lot higher for the firms [38,42,92]. With a lower carbon tax, it is difficult to
achieve higher emission reduction [39]. With the cap-and-trade, however, carbon credits available
in the market [75,92,94] and among the SC partners [6,80] can help in achieving more economic
benefits [6] and emissions reductions. Some studies on subsidy and carbon offset policies are also
available. Compared with the former two policies, the subsidy and the offset policies are voluntary,
rather than compulsory.
The review shows that carbon policy should be designed and implemented for a given specific
situation, and a universal model may not be applicable for both cost and emissions minimization.
For instance, a cost-efficient carbon policy for one industry may not be applicable to the other industry
due to their inherent cost structures [70]. It is worthy to note that, the integration of different carbon
policies (like subsidy and tax or like cap and tax) may be a better option [8,42,85] for the cost and
emissions efficiency. Hence, the industry should make a particular response to a specific carbon policy
by optimizing its specific SCs. Generally speaking, customized techniques are necessary to assist a
firm to pursue low-carbon operations less expensively.
Further Research Directions
Arising from the above, some research directions for consideration are given below.
(1) The current research can be extended to assess the stochastic nature of the carbon policy parameters.
Although the uncertainty in the GSC is mentioned in the literature, it is limited to the customer
demand aspects [38,40,41,69,72,90,109]. The uncertainties can also be seen in various carbon
policies, such as the shift of the carbon tax policy to a carbon trading scheme in Australia [110],
and the parameters of a particular carbon policy, such as the unstable carbon price on the market,
the carbon tax rate and the carbon price on the carbon market. The increasing variability of the
stochastic parameters degrades the financial and environmental performance of a SC Osmani
and Zhang [72]. As these unstable parameters are the major causes leading to SC risk, they also
influence the GSC design. Therefore, uncertainty factors should be used in GSC design.
(2) The current research lacks a comprehensive analysis of international carbon policies on a SC.
The carbon policies along a GSC can vary from one region to another (for example, Europe and
Asia) or from one country to another [111]. Therefore, when regions or country-specific policies
are not considered, it can even lead to a higher level of emission [81] because of carbon leakage.
One possible approach to cope with the carbon leakage problem is to impose innovative carbon
policies, like carbon tariffs on the goods from unregulated countries [81] or a global cap policy [17].
Another study [83] mentions that a policy of incrementally increasing carbon taxes may help
in the coordination of carbon pricing across a SC (that may involve many nations) and it may
support a holistic analysis of carbon policies for a GSC. A possibility of linking carbon policies
across nations for a coordinated emissions reduction is also mentioned in Wang-Helmreich
and Kreibich [10]. Research can, therefore, be extended to analyze the relation between carbon
emissions with different carbon policies and their impact on the GSC design.
(3) Carbon taxes and subsidies can promote remanufacturing [2,7,102] and low-carbon
technologies [107]. The carbon offset policy provides the firms with opportunities to achieve
carbon-neutral SC by engaging in emissions reduction offset projects [112]. However, only
limited studies have mentioned the subsidy, offset, and the pricing policies, and so their extensive
effects on different levels of a SC deserve further investigation. Furthermore, the implications
of carbon policies are higher in SCs [8,68] as the emission reduction activities involve various
firms, government, and customers. Existing studies indicate that the effectiveness of carbon
policies relies highly on the thresholds of the carbon policy parameters. Research can be extended
to study joint carbon policies [39,54,86] and carbon footprints [32]. Such research can provide
valuable insights for policymakers to understand and develop a correct level of subsidies.
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(4) Emissions can be affected through coordination [42,112,113],) or through collaboration [9,44].
Firms can affect their partners’ emissions by coordination, information sharing, or even simply
by leveraging their economic power [38,112]. Most of the studies in a decentralized GSC assume
that there is one leader and one follower in decision making. The competition of the actors in a
supply system or between different supply systems has also been discussed. However, real-world
competition is more complex as it involves multi-faceted actors. For example, two competitors
can cooperate in collecting and disposing of the used products. Therefore, the effect of carbon
policies on a collaborative GSC design becomes necessary.
(5) The sustainability of SCs under carbon policies is another potential area of research. Sustainability
is considered in terms of three main aspects which are economic, environmental and social, and
these three aspects are interdependent in the SCs. In particular, it is worthwhile to note that
social welfare is not exhaustively considered in existing models. As the relationship between the
carbon cost and social welfare also depends on market competition [114], the research can also be
extended to the impact of carbon policy on social welfare. In addition, the sustainability of a GSC
and customers’ willingness to pay for products can also be explored.
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